Take-or-Pay Royalties, the Trust Doctrine, and the Shoshone Case by Kulander, Christopher S.
American Indian Law Review
Volume 29 | Number 1
1-1-2004
Take-or-Pay Royalties, the Trust Doctrine, and the
Shoshone Case
Christopher S. Kulander
South Texas College of Law Houston
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr
Part of the Indian and Aboriginal Law Commons, and the Oil, Gas, and Mineral Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
American Indian Law Review by an authorized editor of University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons. For more information, please
contact darinfox@ou.edu.
Recommended Citation
Christopher S. Kulander, Take-or-Pay Royalties, the Trust Doctrine, and the Shoshone Case, 29 Am. Indian L. Rev. 101 (2004),
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol29/iss1/4
NOTES
TAKE-OR-PAY ROYALTIES, THE TRUST DOCTRINE AND
THE SHOSHONE CASE
Dr. Christopher S. Kulander*
This note examines the portion of the Shoshone Indian Tribe of the Wind
River Reservation v. United States case that deals with whether royalties are
owed on take-or-pay payments and the trust doctrine establishing a fiduciary
relationship between tribes and the federal government. This note describes
why the exclusion of royalties derived from take-or-pay settlements, as
described in Shoshone' and made under the authority of the Indian Mineral
Development Act of 1938, violated the fiduciary obligation of the Secretary
of the Interior.
Because this note will be of interest to two often distinct types of lawyers,
those in oil and gas and those involved in Federal Indian law - neither of
whom might be familiar with the appropriate tenets of the other field's body
of law - this note will first address the fundamental legal concepts at play
in both bodies. On the Indian law side, the fiduciary relationship of the
United States to tribes in general will be addressed first. Second, the tribes
as mineral lessors and the processes by which the Secretary represents them
will be discussed. Turning to oil and gas law, the practice of take-or-pay
payments for gas transport will be described first. Second, royalties in
general and how royalties are calculated for take-or-pay settlements will be
briefly explained.
Both of these bodies of law are tied together under the facts of the
ongoing Shoshone take-or-pay royalty case. In particular, the two primary
arguments under which the federal government attempted summary
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judgment: the "maximization" claim and the take-or-pay royalty claim. For
each of these two claims, both the defendant's and plaintiff's arguments will
be examined, and the court of claims ruling will be explained and then
analyzed. Finally, a possible exception to the maximization rule is presented
and a recommended change to the present federal take-or-pay royalty
problem is proposed.
L Tribal Lands and the Federal/Indian Relationship
A. The Federal-Indian Trust Relationship
All three branches of the federal government have recognized that a general
fiduciary relationship exists between the federal government and the tribes.'
In Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, the Supreme Court said that the relationship
was "that of a ward to his guardian,"3 and that "moral obligations of the
highest responsibility and trust"4 exist that should "be judged by the most
exacting fiduciary standards."5 For over forty years, tribes have fought to
translate the accepted plenary power that the federal government has over
tribes into the recognition of a parallel series of fiduciary duties.6 Courts have
responded to these claims by looking closely at statutes, treaties and federal
common law related to trust.7
Like all suits brought against the government generally, a three-part
threshold test must be met for a suit by a tribe against the government for
breach of trust to proceed.' First, the tribe must choose a court with subject
matter jurisdiction over the claim.9 Here, the Shoshone Tribe of the Wind
River Reservation (the Tribe) has invoked the Tucker Act,'" which allows the
2. Nell Jessup Newton, Enforcing the Federal-Indian Trust Relationship After Mitchell,
31 CATH. U. L. REV. 635, 635 (1985).
3. Id. (quoting Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831)).
4. Id. (quoting Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 297 (1942)).
5. Id. (quoting Seminole, 316 U.S. at 297).
6. Id. at 636.
7. Id. at 638.
8. Id. at 639.
9. Id.
10. Act of Mar. 3, 1887, ch. 359, 24 Stat. 505 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 28 U.S.C.).
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court of claims" to hear claims "founded... upon... any Act of Congress."12
Second, the government must have created a statutory avenue to accept suit.13
The Tribe has no problem with this step because Congress changed the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) in 1976, expressly waiving sovereign
immunity for claims arising from the APA."4 Third, the tribe must state a
claim upon which relief may be granted. 5 The government finds the third
point unmet in their motions for dismissal.
In 1980 and 1983, a pivotal pair of cases, known as Mitchell 116 and
Mitchell JH,17 signaled a new course for the trust relationship. In Mitchell , a
case involving the timber rights of the Quinault and Quileute tribes in
Washington State, the Court overruled the court of claims and ruled that the
General Allotment Act "created only a limited trust relationship between the
United States and the allottees that does not impose any duty upon the
government to manage timber resources."' 8 The case was remanded to the
court of claims, who then found that the federal statute (the Tucker Act) and
regulations promulgated within these statues placed implicit fiduciary duties
upon the United States in its management of reservation timber and that these
regulations and statutes could give rise to damages if the fiduciary duty related
to them was breached.' 9 The court of claims therefore ruled that the
respondents could proceed with their claim.20 Mitchell I established a base
level of trust 'where remedies are limited to enforcement of the specific
purposes of the regulation or statute.2'
The duty described in Mitchell H is, in contrast to the general level of trust
found in Mitchell I, is a strict fiduciary duty rooted in the actual federal
government's direction of the Indian asset and benefits and defined by specific
11. 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (2000).
12. Id. "The Court of Claims shall have jurisdiction to render judgment upon any claim
against the United States founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress ...
Id.
13. Newton, supra note 2, at 642.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535 (1980). This case is generally referred to as
Mitchell 1.
17. United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206 (1983). This case is generally referred to as
Mitchell II.
18. United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 542 (1980).
19. Mitchell v. United States, 664 F.2d 265 (Ct. Cl. 1981) (en banc).
20. ld. at 274.
21. Mitchell 1, 445 U.S. at 542.
No. 1]
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regulations and statutes.22 Thus, the two Mitchell cases suggest that there are
two other types of trust relationships above the general trust relationship
founded in Cherokee Nation.
B. Development of Indian Land and the Trust Doctrine
Tribal land is exceptional in that the equitable title is held by the whole
tribe for the benefit of all the individuals in the tribe.23 Individual members
have no inheritable title in tribal land.24 Most lands held by tribes is by
aboriginal title arising from governmental recognition of the Indians' right to
quiet enjoyment of the lands even after the fee of such land becomes vested
in the federal government. 25 Land protected under aboriginal title may be
recognized by treaty, 26 as was the Shoshone tribal land constituting most of the
Wind River reservation in Wyoming.
Treaties typically involve federal recognition of aboriginal title.27 Congress
stopped making treaties with Indians in 187 1.28 In United States v. Shoshone
Tribe, the Supreme Court held that the overall goal of the federal government
in treaties was to deal equitably with tribes and to seek no reward for itself.
29
Thus, the treaty with the tribe was found to include the mineral rights under
the land turned over to the tribe, even though the treaty made no mention of
the mineral rights.3" Such an inquiry is usually conducted on a case-by-case
basis and requires an examination of the treaty.3' After the treaty period, the
government has relied on statutes to carry out its land dealings with Indian
tribes.32 However, between 1871 and 1919, the President could use executive
orders to set land aside.33 In 1919, Congress took exclusive control of this
power.34
22. Mitchell 11, 463 U.S. at 206.
23. ROCKY MT. MiN. L. FOUND., LAW OF FEDERAL OIL AND GAS LEASES § 26.01 [2] (200 1)
(Tribal Lands) [hereinafter LAW OF FEDERAL OIL AND GAS LEASES].
24. Id.
25. Id. § 26.01[2][a].
26. Id.
27. Id. § 26.01[2][b].
28. Id. § 26.01[2][b].
29. United States v. Shoshone Tribe, 304 U.S. 111, 116 (1938).
30. LAW OF FEDERAL OIL AND GAS LEASES, supra note 23, § 26.01 [2] [b].
31. Id.
32. Id. § 26.01[2][c].
33. Id. § 26.01[2][d].
34. Id.
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Tribes are considered to be "domestic, dependent nations," a status rooted
in the ancient and aboriginal nature of the Tribes.35 As a result of this status,
the federal government recognizes a fiduciary relationship between the United
States, Indian tribes, and their individual members.36 Because of this
relationship, the federal government is the guardian of tribes and members and
must assume that all government actions affecting tribes, individual Indians,
or their property are in the Indians' "best interest."37 The federal government,
through the Secretary of the Interior, must meet the strictest fiduciary
principles.38
C. Tribes as Mineral Lessors
Beginning in 1790, Congress passed a series of acts, commonly known as
the Indian Non-Intercourse Acts, to govern and regulate the sale of tribal
lands.39 Such acts commonly stipulated that no sale of land by any tribe or
individual was valid unless concluded in accordance with a treaty between the
federal government and the appropriate tribe.n These acts are important to
mineral lessees because all leases and mineral agreements entered into by a
tribe or individual Indian must be examined and approved by the Secretary.4
In addition, any lease farmout agreements and modifications of a previously
approved lease or agreement must also be approved by the Secretary.42
The Indian Mineral Leasing Act (IMLA) of 1938 arose from a need to
consolidate and simplify lease provisions and practices.43 The 1938 Act had
three express aims.' First, the Act attempted to establish one single set of
leasing procedures.45 Second, the IMLA was passed to help achieve the goal
of tribal revitalization - the primary goal of the Indian Reorganization Act
35. Id. § 26.02[1].
36. Id. § 26.02[2].
37. Id. (quoting Assiniboine & Sioux Tribes of the Fort Peck Indian Reservation v. Bd. of
Oil & Gas Conservation of Mont., 792 F.2d 782, 794 (9th Cir. 1986)).
38. Id.
39. Id. § 26.02[3].
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Judith V. Royster, Mineral Development in Indian Country: The Evolution of Tribal
Control over Mineral Resources, 29 TULSA L.J. 541, 558 (1994).
44. Id.
45. Id.
No. 1] NOTES
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of 1934.46 Third, the Act was to encourage economic development and to
insure tribes "the greatest return for their tribal minerals. 47
Specifically, the Act established requirements for surety bonds, bonuses,
rents, and royalties for mineral leases.48 Unfortunately, the IMLA leasing
system was fraught with implementation problems which led to corruption -
theft and fraud.49 The Act also gave the tribes a limited right to sue for breach
of trust.50 During the duration of a lease, the Secretary is required to watch
over the lessee's performance in order to guard the Indian's mineral assets and
economic potential - which includes overseeing actions mandated by both
federal regulations and the terms of the lease.5 '
Although flawed, particularly in its "one size fits all tribes" approach to
development, the IMLA represented a major advance for mineral-owning
tribes.52 In Jicarilla Apache Tribe v. Supron Energy, after listing the extensive
responsibilities of the government in representing tribes in leasing
negotiations, the court noted, "the evident purpose of the statute is to ensure
that Indian tribes receive the maximum benefit from mineral deposits on their
lands through leasing."53
The Omnibus Leasing Act makes all oil and gas lease activities on Indian
lands subject to the regulations of the Secretary. 4 In addition, a 1909 Act
authorizing the leasing of allotted lands also authorizes the Secretary to "make
such rules and regulations as may be necessary.. Section 8 of the IMLA
mandates that the Secretary will execute regulations to assist achievement of
the Act's purpose.56 The chief purpose of the operating regulations for leases
is to help assume that exploitation activities are performed so as to achieve the
greatest recovery with minimum waste. 7
Royalty accounting and payments for Indian leases are generally governed
by the lease provisions, related regulations, and by the notices of oil and gas
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 565.
49. Id. at 567.
50. Id. at 569.
51. Id. at 570.
52. Id. at 560.
53. Jicarilla Apache Tribe v. Supron, 728 F.2d 1555, 1570 (10th Cir. 1980).
54. LAW OF FEDERAL OIL AND GAS LEASES, supra note 23, § 26.01 [2][b].
55. 25 U.S.C. § 396 (2000).
56. LAW OF FEDERAL OIL AND GAS LEASES, supra note 23, § 26.01[21[b].
57. Id.
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lease sales. 5' Royalties are set by the Secretary.59 The Mineral Management
Service (MMS) regulations, controlling the value of royalties for oil and gas
from Indian lands, are very similar to the regulations addressing valuation for
federal oil and gas leases.' ° The regulations are generally the same for leases
on both reservation lands and allotted lands, and provide broadly that, with the
exception of advance payments to the superintendent of the reservation after
the first year of the lease, payments of rentals and royalties are controlled by
statute.6'
I. Take-or-Pay Payments and Royalties on Take-or-Pay Payments
A. Take-or-Pay Payments Generally
Producers (typically an oil company who has leased from a landowner) sell
gas to various purchasers. Either the producers or purchasers arrange to
transport the gas via a common-carrier pipeline, typically a local gas
distributor or industry.62  Historically, producers sold gas to pipeline
companies who transported the gas for resale to local distributors or industry.
Under either marketing scenario, however, the gas sale contract may be on a
take-or-pay basis. In the event the purchaser takes less than the minimum
quantity of gas required by the contract, the purchaser must pay for gas not
taken. Payments made for gas not taken are known as take-or-pay payments.63
For example, assume that Producer A agrees to sell $200 worth of gas to
Purchaser B with which he has a 25% take-or-pay agreement. When the time
for the production and shipment occurs, Purchaser B is overbooked and cannot
take the gas. Under the take-or-pay provision, Purchaser B will pay Producer
A $50. Take-or-pay contracts provide the producer with a stable revenue flow
to cover the expenses related to development, production, gathering, and
(sometimes) processing and treatment during times when the gas market is
slack.'
If within a set period of time from the making of the take-or-pay payment,
the pipeline can take extra gas over what it currently must buy from the
producer, that extra or "make-up" gas will be credited against the money paid
58. J.S. LOWE ET AL., OIL AND GAS LAW 932 (4th ed. 2002).
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. 30C.F.R. § 218.51 (2002).
62. LOWE ET AL., supra note 58, at 941.
63. Id.
64. Id.
No. 11 NOTES
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2004
AMERICAN INDIAN LA W REVIEW
earlier on the take-or-pay agreement.65 In the example in the previous
paragraph, if within an expiration date expressed in the take-or-pay agreement,
Purchaser B can take more gas over-and-above its periodic obligation to
Producer A, that extra gas will be credited toward the $50 it paid earlier.
However, if within the agreed-upon time window the Purchaser is unable to
take makeup gas, the make-up right simply expires.
Royalty on take-or-pay disputes arose because the supply shortages that
caused rising prices for natural gas in the 1970s led some purchasers to
compete for additional supply by offering to "take or pay" for high
percentages of well delivery capacity.66 Up until the middle of the 1980s,
most of the gas produced in the United States was sold via long-term contracts
at, or close to, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC)-maximum
lawful price.67 When demand for gas fell in the 1980s, purchaser take-or-pay
liabilities became so substantial that they were forced to breach their take-or-
pay obligations or face bankruptcy.
As the 1980s progressed, due to sudden and long-lasting price declines, the
pipeline companies found themselves in deepening financial straits concerning
take-or-pay payments because they could not resell the great volumes of high-
priced gas they were obliged to take under the long term contracts they signed
when prices were high. 68 As a result, the pipelines began to build-up large
volumes of take-or-pay liabilities. 69 Not only could they not sell all the gas
they were forced to pay for under the take-or-pay contracts, they could never
go beyond that and purchase any make-up gas - the gas that they could not
take earlier.7" Since they could not take the make-up gas in a timely manner,
the credit expired and they could thus never hope to make up the take-or-pay
payment made earlier.7 In short, the declining market set up a downward
spiral for the pipelines: they had to pay high prices for gas they could not sell,
and worse, they could never go further and take the "make up" gas they
needed to take to bring down the amount of take-or-pay payments they were
being forced to make.72 The system they had set up in the realm of climbing
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. LOWE ETAL., supra note 58, at 941.
69. Id. at 942.
70. JAMES M. GRIFFEN & HENRY B. STEELE, ENERGY ECONOMICS AND POuCY 303 (2d ed.
1986).
71. Id.
72. Id.
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prices in the 1970s threatened to ruin them in the long period of declining
prices in the 1980s.73
The producers realized that to hold the pipelines to the take-or-pay
contracts would, in many cases, simply result in the pipelines going into
bankruptcy, nobody getting paid anything and further havoc in the gas
markets.74 Accordingly, the first wave of take-or-pay litigation led largely to
settlements. Many producers decided to cut their losses and allow the
pipelines to either "buy out" or, less commonly, "buy down" the take-or-pay
liabilities they had incurred. 75 A "buy out" take-or-pay settlement is one
where the pipeline pays a sum and simply is released from the gas contract
and any further liability.76 A "buy down" take-or-pay settlement continues the
contractual relationship but with a lower take-or-pay liability and lower gas
prices.77
B. Royalties on Take-or-Pay Payments and Take-or-Pay Settlements
Generally
In the aftermath of the initial round of take-or-pay litigation between
producers and purchasers, litigation erupted over whether royalty was due on
take-or-pay payments. 78 The litigation resulted in two views. The first is that
royalty is not owed until there "actual production." Thus, take-or-pay benefits
were not subject to royalty because they were payments made in lieu of
production.79 Under these cases, the royalty was due when the purchaser
finally did take production in the form of "make-up" gas. 80 In contrast,
another line of cases had said that take-or-pay payments are immediately
royalty bearing and thus royalty is due on take-or-pay benefits immediately
upon receipt by the producer because the lease royalty clause is a statement
of the general expectations of the parties and the take-or-pay benefits
constitute part of the total proceeds paid for gas.81 Under both lines of cases,
provided the make-up gas is eventually produced, the royalty owner gets paid.
The difference is when the royalty is paid.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. FRED BOSSELMAN ET AL., ENERGY, ECONOMICS AND THE ENVIRONMENT 590 n.4 (1st
ed. 2000)
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 244.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
No. 1]
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With the signing of the more common "buy out" variety, any future
production was negated; therefore no royalties would ever be collectable
under the agreements if the "actual production' doctrine was required for
royalties to be due. This meant that the producer who first was paid take-or-
pay payments and did not have to pay royalty on them because no 'actual'
production had yet occurred could also accept the settlement and would never
have to pay royalty on either any previously-accepted take-or-pay payments
or the gas contract settlement, no 'actual' production attributed to the
agreement would ever take place. Thus, in states that required actual
production and, after the Diamond Shamrock case, in federal leases, royalty
owners were not getting royalties for take-or-pay gas contract buyouts.82
This is the situation that the Indians found themselves in when they brought
suit. By retroactively changing the royalty accounting practices and by
accepting the oil company producer's classification of roughly half the gas
contract settlement as non-royalty bearing, the federal government knowingly
denied the Shoshone Tribe the opportunity to collect royalty on 47% of $39
million or $2 million.83
C. Royalties on Take-or-Pay Payments and Take-or-Pay Settlements on
Tribal Lands
The government did not always use the "actual production" rule to
determine when take-or-pay payments became royalty bearing.8" Before
November 1988, the government had a long-standing policy that royalties
were immediately payable on take-or-pay payments received by a producer.
Actual production, or the taking of make-up gas, was not necessary for the
tribes to get their royalties for take-or-pay.8
In the 1988 regulation, however, the government altered its decades-old
practice of making take-or-pay settlements royalty bearing upon receipt by the
lessee. 86 The decisive cases causing the government to change its policy over
take-or-pay payments and royalty were the Fifth Circuit's ruling in Diamond
Shamrock Exploration Co. v. Hode87 and Independent Petroleum Ass'n of
82. LOWE ET AL., supra note 58, at 942.
83. Brief for Appellant at 12-13, Shoshone Indian Tribe of the Wind River Reservation,
Wyo. v. United States, 56 Fed. CI. 639 (2003) (No. 458-79 L).
84. Id. at 7.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 9.
87. Diamond Shamrock Exploration Co. v. Hodel, 853 F.2d 1159 (5th Cir. 1988).
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America v. Babbitt (IPAA).88 In Diamond Shamrock, the Fifth Circuit
changed the federal (non-Indian) leases over to the "actual production"
variety.89 After Diamond Shamrock, the Department of the Interior (Interior)
voluntarily changed to the "actual production" method of take-or-pay royalty
collection.9" In IPAA, the panel ruled that Interior could not meaningfully
distinguish take-or-pay payments and take-or-pay settlements and thus,
because of Interior's revised royalty regulations from 1988, take-or-pay
settlements could not be royalty bearing until make-up gas was taken, which
seldom occurred due to the fact most settlements were buyouts.9
III. The Shoshone Case: Take-or-Pay Royalty Payments and the Trust
Doctrine
A. Case History
This case was filed in 1979 and has been divided into four phases for
adjudication. 92 A more complete background of the other three parts can be
found in the court's earlier opinions.93 The contractual details of the "ARCO
Settlement" that set into motion the events that led to this case are agreed
upon by both parties.94 ARCO, the producer and lessee, entered into an
agreement with a pipeline company, Montana-Dakota Utilities, in order to
settle a case that was underway in the District Court of Dallas, Texas.95
Government records, the "Explanation to Accompany MMS Form 2014
Report," reveal that ARCO was to receive $39 million in cash to settle MDU's
nonperformance under a Gas Purchase Contract over the lease area in
Wyoming.96 A portion of the settlement was classified as take-or-pay
88. Indep. Petroleum Ass'n of Am. v. Babbitt, 92 F.3d 1248 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
89. Id. at 1253.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 1260.
92. Shoshone Indian Tribe of the Wind River Reservation, Wyo. v. United States, 56 Fed.
CI. 639, 640 (2003).
93. See Shoshone Indian Tribe of the Wind River Reservation, Wyo. v. United States, 51
Fed. CI. 60 (2001) (deciding statute of limitations issue); Shoshone Indian Tribe of the Wind
River Reservation, Wyo. v. United States, 52 Fed. Cl. 614 (2002) (deciding pre-trial motions
regarding claims for management of the Tribes' sand and gravel); Shoshone Tribe of Indians v.
United States, 299 U.S. 476 (providing history of the joint occupancy by the Tribes of the Wind
River Reservation).
94. Shoshone, 56 Fed. Cl. at 641.
95. Id.
96. Id.
NOTESNo. 1]
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settlement payments, which would not be royalty bearing because there would
never be actual production.97 Shoshone deals with portions of these lost
royalties that would have gone to the Tribe, but did not because of this
dubious classification.98 Prior to the 1988 regulation, the government would
have regarded this take-or-pay settlement as royalty bearing.
The Tribe sought damages, saying that the government failed in its trust
duties by not challenging the classification of the $39 million ARCO
settlement as take-or-pay and thus non-royalty bearing. The latest round of
motions in this case concerned the motivations of the ARCO agreement and
the government's lack of reaction to the classification of the take-or-pay
settlement as non-royalty bearing. The government filed a motion for
summary judgment on this issue, claiming that the tribe had no evidence that
the allocation of the money into the non-royalty bearing category was
improper, and thus the government's nonchallenging of the allocation was
acceptable.99 The Tribe responded saying that the government motion was
premature and that the tribe's discovery efforts have not yet had a chance to
bear fruit."° The court of claims in June 2003 denied the government's motion
on this point.'0 '
Despite decades of including take-or-pay payments in the calculation of
royalty, the government issued a revised regulation in late 1988 that take-or-
pay payment would no longer be included in the calculation of royalty on
leases of federal lands. 1 2 This "Revision of Gross Proceeds Definition in Oil
and Gas Valuation Regulations" was the federal regulation that was in effect
when the ARCO settlement was made that the government used to calculate
royalty.0 3 The original leases were silent on the issue of whether the value of
what was 'produced and saved' - that figure that represented the value from
which royalty is calculated - included take-or-pay payments such as the
ARCO settlement."°4 The Tribe, however, asserts that "the government had
97. Id.
98. Id. at 642.
99. Brief for Defendant, Shoshone Indian Tribe of the Wind River Reservation, Wyo. v.
United States, 56 Fed. CI. 639 (2003) (No. 458-79 L).
100.
100. Brief for Plaintiff, Shoshone Indian Tribe of the Wind River Reservation, Wyo. v.
United States, 56 Fed. CI. 639 (2003) (No. 458-79 L).
101. Shoshone, 56 Fed. CI. at 651.
102. 53 Fed. Reg. 45,082-83 (Nov. 8, 1988) (codified at 30 C.F.R. § 206).
103. Shoshone, 56 Fed. CI. at 641.
104. Id. at 650.
(Vol. 29
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a well-established policy in effect which made it clear that take-or-pay
amounts were to be included in calculating royalties."' '°
On January 3, 2003, the Tribe filed a "Brief Identifying the Issues to be
Resolved at Trial of Oil and Gas Phase One" (Brief)."° The government
responded on January 31, 2003, raising several motions to dismiss for
summary judgment, entitled "Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment on
Plaintiffs Claims of Breach of Trust on Plaintiffs' Take-or-Pay Claims"
(Defendant's Motion). °7 In addition, on March 20, 2003, the government
filed Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition to Tribe's Opposition to
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiff's Take-or-Pay
Claims.'0 8 At an April 7, 2003, status conference, the court decided to take up
the issues presented by these motions.'09 On June 9, 2003, the court of claims,
Judge Emily C. Hewitt presiding, issued an opinion addressing the portion of
the government's motion that concerned the law applicable to the take-or-pay
claims.
B. The Current State of the Case
The current phase involves plaintiff's claims of breach of fiduciary duty by
the MMS and its predecessors in the management and payment of royalties.
The latest opinion addresses the statutory and regulatory framework pursuant
to which the tribes receive royalties for the oil and gas extracted from their
land and the interpretation of a 1989 settlement agreement between several oil
companies regarding oil and gas extraction (the ARCO settlement).
On June 9, 2003, the court of claims handed down a response to the
government's two motions for dismissal. The first motion the court of claims
addressed was that the government did not have to "maximize" the lease
revenue to the Tribe (the "Maximization" Claim)."0 The second motion was
that the government did not violate its fiduciary duty to the Tribe by allowing
the producers to pocket the entire take-or-pay gas contract "buy-out"
settlement (the aforementioned "ARCO settlement") without paying out any
royalties to the Tribe and, by default, accepting the fact that no actual
production would ever be made."' ARCO did not pay royalties on the
105. Brief for Plaintiff at 6-7, Shoshone (No. 458-79 L).
106. Shoshone, 56 Fed. C1. at 642.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at643.
111. Id. at 649.
No. 1]
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settlement on the grounds that royalties were not due under the government's
1988 regulation.' 12 In short, the dispute here, as was the case in other
litigation in the late 1980s and early 1990s, is whether the settlement amount
allocated for gas not actually produced, but due under the terms of the
contract, was royalty-bearing.
The remaining issues in Defendant's Motion were to be addressed later
after the parties filed additional briefs and gave oral arguments in July 2003.' '
These additional briefs have yet to be acted on by the court of claims. This
note will address issues in the Defendant's Motion, Plaintiff's Motion and the
June 9 opinion of the court of claims.
C. The "Maximization Claim" Dismissal Claim
1. Defendant's Argument for Dismissal
The government's position is that, while they may have a general trust duty
to the tribes, they do not have a duty to "maximize" the lease agreement such
that a tribe gets the maximum possible return for the lease." 4 The
government's motion to dismiss on the duty to maximize profits relies
primarily on two cases to support its argument.' 15 The first case is Pawnee v.
United States."6 In Pawnee, Indian tribes brought an action pertaining to the
Indian Long-Term Leasing Act" 7 claiming the government "breached a
fiduciary obligation to provide that plaintiffs [the Tribe] received royalty
based on 'the highest price paid or offered for like quality gas."'. 8
Here, the government argues that, although the court in Pawnee found that
the United States has a general trust duty to the tribes - much like the finding
in earlier cases going back to Justice Marshall's opinion in Cherokee
Nation - this does not mean that "any and every claim" by an Indian lessor
.necessarily promotes a suitable action for breach of trust." 9
The government advises that careful consideration must be paid to any
particular standards and responsibilities that are imposed by the regulatory and
statutory scheme and argues that there is an absence in this case of any statute
112. 30 C.F.R. § 206 (1988).
113. Shoshone, 56 Fed. C1. at 642.
114. Id. at643.
115. Id.
116. Pawnee v. United States, 830 F.2d 187 (Fed. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1032
(1988).
117. 25 U.S.C. § 396 (2000).
118. Pawnee, 830 F.2d at 191.
119. Shoshone, 56 Fed. C1. at 643.
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or regulation which requires the federal government to maximize the
Shoshone's royalty income. 20 The government further argues that because the
Tribe has not identified any duty that has been breached by the federal
government's alleged failure to maximize profits from the Tribe's oil and gas
leases, the case cannot be heard.' In short, the government argues that the
claims by the Shoshone tribe are effectively identical to those in the Pawnee
case where the plaintiff's claims were for "the highest price paid or offered for
like quantity gas" were denied.
The second case relied upon by the government is United States v. Navajo
Nation.2 2 In Navajo, the Court held that there was no general fiduciary duty
to "maximize" the profits from leases made on behalf of Indian tribes unless
there are accompanied contractual, statutory or regulatory obligations.
2 1
Again, as in their comparison with the Pawnee case, the government asserted
that since (they believe) no regulation exists mandating the maximization of
the Tribe's lease revenue, that the Shoshone's claim should be summarily
dismissed. 124 In addition, the United States argued that since the Tribe offered
no proof of any duties that were breached by the government, the court of
claims had no jurisdiction to hear the case. 25
2. Plaintiffs Argument Against Dismissal
The Shoshone Tribe contended that the regulations and statutory authority
governing the United State's management of the Tribes' oil and gas
established a fiduciary duty of the federal government. The Tribe further
argued that the Interior Department breached its duty established by the IMLA
and subsequent regulations in failing to ensure that the Tribes received full
value for their oil and gas. 26
The Tribe also attempted to distance themselves from "maximization"
arguments not grounded in a regulation or statute.2 7 Instead, the Tribe turned
their arguments to what they claim is a "money-mandating statutory and
regulatory framework."' 28  This framework is what the Tribe claims
120. Id. at 643.
121. See id.
122. United States v. Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. 488 (2003).
123. Id.
124. Shoshone, 56 Fed. C1. at 645.
125. ld. at 642.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 644.
128. Id.
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differentiates this case from the Navajo case, which considered coal, a
commodity without any associated take-or-pay phenomena.
129
Instead of Navajo, the Tribe argues this case more closely resembles United
State v. Mitchell (Mitchell II). 3o In Mitchell H, the Court ruled that a "money-
mandating" fiduciary obligation existed where it did not in Mitchell I, because
of a specific revenue clause within the timber lease in question.' 3' Both the
lease in question here and the timber lease in the Mitchell cases were signed
under the auspices of the 1938 Act, 132 which removed almost all control from
the Indians over the lease specifics and instead allowed the government to
control advertising and bidding of the land and resources. Contrasting
Navajo, the leases in Mitchell II and Shoshone cover timber and oil and gas,
respectively, both of which entail the Secretary to set up sales and examine
and approve all leases and sales contracts. 133 Furthermore, the Secretary must
oversee the continuing operation of the lease. 13
A related question is also raised by the Tribe - that of the government's
duty to accurately conduct an audit of the reasonableness of the royalty the
Tribe was to receive under the lease the Secretary negotiated for them.'35
Despite the government's attempt to say this was purely at the discretion of
the Secretary, the Tribe argues that the government cannot delegate its
fiduciary duty away through cooperative agreements.
136
3. The Court of Federal Claims' Decision
The government's motion to dismiss the Tribe's claim of breach by the
government's failure to "maximize" the Tribes' oil and gas revenues was
denied in part as to United States' failure to collect royalties based on the
proper value of oil and gas and granted in part as to government's failure to
"maximize" the Tribe's oil and gas revenues.'37
129. See id.
130. Id.
131. United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206 (1983) (Mitchell II).
132. Compare 25 C.F.R. § 211.20 (1982), and 25 C.F.R. § 184.4 (1957) with 25 C.F.R. §
227.4 (1982) (addressing oil and gas), and 25 C.F.R. §§ 141.8, 141.9 (1979) (addressing
timber).
133. Shoshone, 56 Fed. Cl. at 644.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 645.
136. Brief for Appellant at 18, Shoshone Indian Tribe of the Wind River Reservation, Wyo.
v. United States, 56 Fed. Cl. 639 (2003) (No. 458-79 L).
137. Shoshone, 56 Fed. Cl. at 649.
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Although the court of claims found this case to resemble Mitchell H more
than Mitchell I and Navajo Nation because of the complex nature of the oil
and gas lease specifically and the extensive statutory framework related to
collection of royalty as detailed in the Federal Oil and Gas Royalty
Management Act (FOGRMA) 138 and the Indian Mineral Leasing Act
(IMLA) 139 generally, it did not find that there was an overall duty to maximize
the royalty to the Indians on every point in the claim. On the other hand, the
government was found to have a duty to provide an accurate economic
analysis of the value of the oil and gas produced from Indian land. In addition,
not doing this analysis was not within the discretion of the Secretary despite
the inclusion of the clause "if data are available" in the lease. The Court ruled
that this created a condition precedent which did not make the subsequent
decision to not provide an accurate valuation discretionary.
4. Analysis
Despite Mitchell I, egregious failures of the government's general
fiduciary duty to the tribes such as in this case should give rise to a breach
of trust action. The third goal of the 1938 Indian Mineral Leasing Act was
to insure tribes "the greatest return for their property."'4 ° This broad goal,
however, yields to specific particulars when considering the actual terms of
the lease and the government's fiduciary duty. 4' In Pawnee, the lease
regulation expressly said: "for the major portion of the gas 'produced and
sold from the field'."'42 The court in that case said that the tribe wanted the
Secretary to go beyond the regulation.'43 Despite the general duty to bring
in the greatest return in the 1938 statute, the specific duty called for in
Pawnee merely said "the major portion" in the lease.'" The tribe in that
case therefore had not proved that the Secretary had breached her duty
because they did not prove the 'major portion' criterion and had asked the
federal government to go beyond what was required in the lease."'
When the government here argued that the Tribe's maximization claims
were in effect the same as the Tribe's in Pawnee and because the royalty
138. 30 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1757 (2000).
139. 25 U.S.C. §§ 396a-396g (2000).
140. S. REP. No. 985, at 2-3 (1937); H.R. REP. No. 1872, at 1-3 (1938).
141. United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206 (1983) (Mitchell 11).
142. United States v. Pawnee, 830 F.2d 187, 191 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
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valuation regulations were identical in Pawnee and in this case, they missed
both the obvious difference between the root cause of the present claim and
that in the Pawnee case and, perhaps, a practical difference as well. In
Pawnee, the dispute was over the valuation of the royalties - were they to
be measured from "the average of the three highest prices at the time of and
in the county where it was produced" or were they to be measured basis on
value "for the major portion" of the gas "produced and sold from the field
where the leased land are situated?"' 46 The regulations involved in that case
made it clear: "the major portion" calculation was to be used. The tribe
there clearly wanted the federal government to go beyond what the leases
and regulations called for to value royalty.'47 Such is not the case here. A
better argument is that, whether or not the pre-1988 policy of take-or-pay
royalties is judged to have the weight of a specific regulation under which
a fiduciary responsibility exists.'48 A better policy is that, when the choice
is simply between maintaining the long-standing policy of royalty collection
on take-or-pay payments or using the 1988 regulation to stop collecting
money on pre-existing leases until actual production, that the payments be
included because that is what is clearly in harmony with a general fiduciary
relationship since the take-or-pay gas contract settlement will not be royalty
bearing otherwise.
In addition, practically speaking, why a court, absent a specific regulation
to maximize a particular aspect of a lease, would hesitate to allow a breach
of trust claim for every possible instance where value was not maximized,
is easy to understand. Oil and gas leases can be very complex.'4 9 In
addition, they also can last years or even decades. They commonly involve
a great deal of risk and speculation. Often, only when the lease and
production are long done can hindsight effectively image what would have
been the optimal position the government should have taken with regard to
its fiduciary duty to negotiate the best lease for a tribe. If breach of trust
actions arose from every possible lack of maximization claim not rooted in
a specific statute or regulation, but rather in the general fiduciary duty of the
government to the tribe, the potential for litigation would multiply.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206 (1983) (Mitchell 11).
149. For example, the definitive treatise on oil and gas law, the Kuntz Law Oil and Gas
series, devotes hundreds of pages of text in the original volume and the supplements to laws and
concepts revolving around oil and gas leases.
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However, this does not mean that where a governing statute or
regulation - or policy, as will be subsequently covered - might be lacking
should no breach of trust claim ever be allowed. In Pawnee, as in many
royalty calculation disputes, the correct values may be hard to determine.
Should the court use the "amount received" or the "market value" approach
to determine royalty?"50 Are the post-production sales really being
conducted at arm's length?' 5 ' Should the "work back"'5 method for royalty
calculation be employed? These can be difficult questions even with
regulations and statutes to guide the government.
In the Shoshone case, in contrast, the question over valuation is clear.
The Tribe either received the royalty on the 47% of $39 million or they did
not. Lease negotiations were not underway. These two outcomes
represented the options available to the government when they invoked the
dubious 1988 regulation to stop collecting royalties on leases until
production, which in turn resulted in no royalty being paid to the Tribe -
the wards to which they owe a fiduciary duty - when the ARCO settlement
occurred. This is not a question based on recondite administrative law
doctrine or difficult questions-of-fact. It is rather a clear failure to get the
greatest benefit for the Tribe in a lease that the Tribe, because of the
stipulations of the 1938 Indian Mineral Leasing Act, had negligible input
into making.'53 Where a long-standing policy of an agency is changed and
a new approach is formulated such as will both have a retroactive
application and a clearly negative impact with no offsetting gain on a ward
of that agency - that is where a general fiduciary duty should be applied
150. The proceeds method calculates royalty based on the amount of money the producer
itself makes at sale. The "market value" is just that, the value of the oil or gas on the current
market when the hydrocarbons are produced. Both methods lend themselves to fact-intensive
questions, such as the market value to use, timing, production cost deductibles, etc. 3 EUGENE
KUNTZ, LAW OF OIL & GAS §40.4(a), at 322-26.
151. An "arm's length" deal is between two independent parties who are both (presumably)
governed by self-interest such as they want the best deal they can individually get. A "non-
arm's length" deal is one where two affiliated companies are dealing with one another and thus
give rise to the specter of "sweetheart" deals wherein the price agreed upon may not represent
the true value of the product and possibly hurting the royalty owner. Id. at 332.
152. The "work back" method is commonly used to determine what the true price of a
refined hydrocarbon product is for royalty valuation. The sales history of the final product is
traced back to a point in the transportation/refining progression of the product to that represents
what the lease, case law, or governing statute dictates is the price to be used for royalty
valuation. LOWE ET AL, supra note 58, at 243.
153. Royster, supra note 43, at 580.
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with the greatest vigor. Otherwise, the government's general fiduciary
relationship is just a tapestry of empty words.
The finding by the court of claims that the Secretary is required to
properly value the oil and gas upon which royalties are paid is also
important.'54 This, combined with the fiduciary duties of the government to
tribes, means that the federal government can only be thought to have
constructive knowledge that their decision to allow take-or-pay royalties to
not be paid on the ARCO settlement would result in a huge loss to the
Indians. That this loss is actionable seems unquestionable.
D. Take-or-Pay Royalty Claim
1. Defendant's Arguments for Dismissal
The government argued that under the applicable law and precedents, the
take-or-pay portions of the ARCO settlement at issue were not royalty-
producing.'55 While the government acknowledged a duty under various
leases to pay royalties at certain percentage rates, it argued that the leases do
not define what oil and gas shall be subject to the obligation to pay
royalties. 5 6 Royalty valuation, according to the government, is therefore
governed by the regulations which are in effect when the royalties are made,
instead of the policy in place when the leases were constructed.' 57 The
government agreed that if a regulation or statute is in effect at the time of the
signing of the lease it should then continue to regulate. 58 However, they also
maintain that, absent an express authorization of Congress to change it, the
policy of making take-or-pay payments royalty-bearing should not have the
weight of an actual regulation because it was not stated expressly in the lease
and was not on any actual administration regulatory books. ' 9
2. Plaintif's Arguments Against Dismissal
The Tribe countered that the government seeks to apply current regulations
retroactively. Instead, the Tribe argues that regulations and policies that were
in effect when the lease was entered into should govern. 160 The Tribe also
argued that the agency's interpretation at the time the leases were signed was
154. Shoshone, 56 Fed. CI. at 649.
155. Id. at 642.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. See id. at 650-5 1.
160. Id. at 642.
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what was relied upon by the parties, and that allowing the DOI to change the
rules now would hurt the Tribes by binding them into long-term leases that
can be altered at any time at the whim of the United States. 6 '
3. The Court of Claims' Decision
The Court of Claims ruled that the government's motion for summary
judgment on the Tribe's claims of breach of trust on their take-or-pay claims
was to be granted in part as to the applicability of the November 1988
regulations to the ARCO settlement. 62 The Court of Claims ruled that the
November 1988 regulation amenable with the Diamond Shamrock decision
could be validly applied retroactively. The Court relied on a narrow reading
of the previous Supreme Court ruling that the Chevron deference applies to
"a formal adjudication" but not to "policy statements, agency manuals, and
enforcement guidelines, all of which lack the force of law. . . ." to rule that
the Chevron deference does not apply to the pre-1988 principal. 63 The Court
of Claims went on to reason that the lack of precedent for Chevron deference
being applied to an agency weighed against the Tribe."6 In short, even though
the government's new regulation opened the door to the Indians losing the
royalty on the gas contract settlement, the court of claims ruled that the
government was permitted to rely on it because of a relatively obscure
administrative law doctrine and because the lease which the government wrote
for the Tribe in the 1940s and early 1960s was silent on the subject of take-or-
pay gas contract settlements, a phenomenon unique to the 1980s and
beyond. 
65
4. Analysis of the Take-or-Pay Decision
The government's position is untenable. Even if the general fiduciary duty
of the government will not give rise to an action for breach of trust, the
specific nature of the oil and gas lease and the government's long standing
policy of making royalties on take-or-pay payments due when the payments
are received by the producer should allow a breach of trust action under
Mitchell I.
161. Id. at 642-43.
162. Id. at 651.
163. Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000).
164. Shoshone, 56 Fed. C1. at 650.
165. Id.
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Indeed, in September 2003, the court of claims addressed various summary
judgment motions advanced by the government.' Denying a motion for
summary judgment on the claim that the government had not violated the
fiduciary duty to collect royalties, the court noted that the Federal Oil and Gas
Royalty Management Act was "duty imposing" '67 and thus met the basic
threshold to defeat a claim for summary judgment under the duties imposed
under Mitchell 1.16s
The general principles of the 1938 Indian Mineral Leasing Act are clear.
One of them is that the Act was to insure tribes "the greatest return for their
property."'69 How, then, did the 1988 regulation get passed if it potentially
retroactively lowered - sometimes down to zero as in this case - the value
of the lease royalties that tribes would receive on a portion of the lease? No
compelling reason for this retroactive change in royalty valuation has ever
been presented by the MMS.
The court in Jicarilla Apache Tribe v. Supron Energy Corp. noted that "[i]f
the Secretary is obligated to act as a fiduciary to the Tribe in his
administration of the Tribe's oil and gas reserves, and in his determination of
what royalties the Tribe is due, then his actions must not merely meet the
minimum requirements of administrative law, but must also pass scrutiny
under the more stringent standards demanded of a fiduciary. '
Furthermore, the government can still decide to make nonrecoupable gas
contract settlement payments royalty bearing. In Chevron USA Production
Co. v. U.S. Department of the Interior, a federal district court held that the
decision of Interior to charge royalties on a nonrecoupable settlement payment
made to cancel an existing take-or-pay contract was not arbitrary and
capricious. 7 ' The court reasoned that designation of a payment as
"nonrecoupable" does not settle the matter, that "the fact that a purchaser
receives a reduced price on the gas the purchaser previously contracted to take
as a higher price on gas the purchaser previously contracted to take at a higher
price constitutes a nexus with production" sufficient to support royalty. If
Interior can rule gas contract settlement payments to be royalty bearing for
166. Id.
167. 30 U.S.C. § 1701 (b)(3) (stating that FOGRMA's purpose is "to require the development
of enforcement practices that ensure the prompt and proper collection and disbursement of oil
and gas revenues to ... Indian lessors")
168. Shoshone, 58 Fed. Cl. at 92.
169. S. REP. No. 985, at 2-3 (1937); H.R. REP. No. 1872, at 1-3 (1938).
170. Jicarilla Apache Tribe v. Supron, 728 F.2d 1555, 1563 (10th Cir. 1980).
171. Chevron USA Prod. Co. v. United States Dep't of the Interior, 254 F. Supp. 2d 107
(D.D.C. 2003).
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standard federal leases as in Chevron, how can they retroactively apply a
regulation to make gas contract settlements related to an Indian lease non-
royalty bearing, particularly with a beneficiary for whom the government does
the meaningful lease negotiating for? The government here did not have to
make the gas contract settlement payments to their Shoshone beneficiaries
non-royalty bearing, and in light of the Chevron USA ruling, the action by the
government here to make the gas settlement contract retroactively non-royalty
bearing can be view as nothing but fickle and arbitrary.
Most dubious of all is the court of claims' agreement with the government's
argument that narrowly defines the decades-long guiding principle of take-or-
pay royalties being due on payment as a mere "policy" that can be blithely
changed and applied retroactively by the making of an administrative
regulation and with no act of Congress.' 72 By hinging their argument on this
wordplay, the government all but admits that, if the old take-or-pay policy was
a regulation, the government could not have retroactively applied the 1988
take-or-pay regulation and that the 47% of the gas contract settlement made
by ARCO and the pipelines could not have been designated as a non-royalty
bearing take-or-pay settlement. 173 Chevron deference aside, that this chicanery
could be applied to any contract with the government is bad enough, but to
apply it to a beneficiary of a trust is absurd.
IV. A Possible Solution
Oil and gas contracts can be very complex instruments, containing many
clauses that provide instructions and duties given the occurrence of any
number of contingencies. In addition, many of the clauses require the
presence of the expert witnesses, extensive discovery, and oil and gas
attorneys to effectively litigate.
However, if the fiduciary duty of the Federal government to tribes to
"ensure that Indian tribes receive the maximum benefit from mineral deposits
on their lands through leasing" 74 is going to be attenuated such that individual
tenets of the lease - such as the no royalties on take-or-pay settlements
involved here - are made retroactively applicable despite decades of
harmonious previous contrary practice, this could make the maintenance of an
action for the breach of the federal government's fiduciary duty very difficult
for tribes to maintain. Since Mitchell I, the federal government's general
172. Id. at 115.
173. Shoshone, 56 Fed. C1. at 650.
174. Supron, 728 F.2d at 1565.
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fiduciary relationship is not actionable and thus tribes must always find a
regulation, statute, or lease provision exactly on point over which to bring suit
via Mitchell IL As far as lease provisions go, how can any tribe be expected
to do this if they are not part of the process of lease construction, such as
under the IMLA, which puts the Secretary in the role of negotiator?
A balance must be struck such that the Secretary of the Interior does not
have to "maximize" every particular within an oil and gas lease for a tribe's
benefit provided that the overall lease does indeed maximize the benefit to the
tribe for the deal as a whole. Such give and take in the lease specifics reflects
the realities of modern exploration and production. On the other hand, the
fiduciary duty of the government is both a strict and high measure. Thus, if
one or more items in a lease are not "maximized" for the tribes' benefit, then
other portions of the lease must be increased so that the sum results in the
highest value to the tribe.
Furthermore, the ruling in Mitchell I should not be used to simply do away
with all general claims of breach of trust between the government and Indians.
This might be a good basic policy to curtail litigation over small matters no
one could foresee at the signing of the leases, but as this case clearly shows,
circumstances can arise in which the federal government's duties as a
guardian have been breached and yet a technical maneuver, such as the
application of the Chevron doctrine here, renders a longstanding policy
meaningless with regards to the specific statute and regulation requirement
necessary to invoke the Mitchell II definition of a trust breach.
Finally, in the future, royalty interests for the leases on Indian lands that
were signed under the IMDA should never be retroactively diminished
through maneuvers such as the 1988 regulation. Specifically, if the lease has
made take-or-pay payments royalty bearing upon amount received - and not
actual production - for decades, no wiggle room exists in the trust doctrine
for the federal government to change the policy of royalty collection, thus
denying the tribes of a large royalty payment on a gas contract settlement.
V. Conclusion
The government failed in both the general fiduciary duty to tribes, founded
in Cherokee Nation and the goals of the IMLA, and the specific fiduciary duty
to tribes, as stipulated in Mitchell I1. Mitchell I established that the general
fiduciary duty of the government to tribes does not give rise to an action for
money. However, Mitchell II ruled that specific duties could give rise to such
an action. The government is now allowed to cease collection of royalties on
take-or-pay settlements, not because they negotiated any kind of counter-
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balancing benefit for the Shoshone tribe but rather because Interior changed
their internal policies in 1988. Although this may reflect the overall view of
the federal government that take-or-pay payment royalties should not be
included in federal leases until actual production is made, this policy should
not apply retroactively regarding Indian lands where the Secretary has already
negotiated oil and gas leases on behalf of Indian tribes - particularly if it
clearly cuts a tribe out of a large royalty payment for no reason other than the
government wanting to suddenly (and mysteriously) change a long-standing
and (seemingly) harmonious, policy.'75 If the general fiduciary duty means
anything, Mitchell I should at least include an exception providing a remedy
for retroactive and detrimental policy changes that affect parties with a ward
relationship to the government.
Even if the general fiduciary duty is still dogmatically found to be
automatically not actionable, by not allowing the tribe to challenge this
potential breach of a specific duty simply because the 1988 regulation is not
considered to be under the rubric of the Chevron doctrine denigrates the
overall ruling of Mitchell I. The government should not be the target of a
claim for breach of trust for every possible subvalued royalty-bearing
component of a complex lease exercised over a period of years or even
decades that may not be maximized at every turn. The Secretary should have
some wiggle room in lease construction, lowering some values of the whole
in order to get a better return on other portions of the lease and hopefully
increasing the final sum of the benefit to the tribe. In addition, if the passage
of years and hindsight indicate that the good faith efforts by the federal
government in negotiating a lease do not lead to the greatest possible
maximization of valuation for a tribe, then that should not be actionable under
the limitation of Mitchell I and Navajo. However, the fiduciary duty of the
government, based on lease specifics and a long-standing policy stance of the
government, demands that no portion of the overall value of a lease to a tribe
be retroactively and arbitrarily lowered - or, as in this case, entirely
eliminated - so as to lower the final benefit to the wardflessor.
175. One wonders why the government would change the policy of the timing of take-or-pay
payments. The money collected by the tribe here would have come from an oil company, not
the government, and yet it is the government that gets sued. What possible motivation did
Interior have to make this change and expose itself to liability? Was this a case of "pin the
lawsuit on Uncle Sam" by government officials friendly with the oil industry? Given the
circulation of people from industry to government and back, is that a possibility?
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